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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to apply economic analysis to the oppor-
tunities and choices of single individual ‘lone wolf’ terrorists whose attacks are 
characterised by ‘sprees’ of violence, usually shooting sprees in public places, 
that last only for a relatively short period of time. The spree lone wolf also emerges 
suddenly. Having previously allocated no resources to terrorism, he suddenly and 
all at once allocates all of his resources, including time, to terrorism. The first step 
to providing guidance to governments and their law enforcement agencies is to 
encompass some important elements of the spree lone wolf’s opportunities and 
choices within an economic analytical framework. The first steps towards this are 
undertaken in this paper by exploring the opportunities and choices of the spree 
lone wolf from a risk-reward perspective and a treatment of the spree lone wolf as 
an individual who, while attempting to maximise his expected utility, shuns the 
risk-reduction benefits of ‘time diversification’ and suddenly plunges all of his 
resources into terrorism within a single time period. The analysis shows that such 
behaviour can be explained within an economic model of choice and clears the 
way for further theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. 
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1  Introduction
Lone wolf terrorism has been described by governments and security agencies 
as the most significant terrorism threat. A lone wolf terrorist operates indepen-
dently, alone, outside of a command structure. Some lone wolves have been 
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able to inflict greater amounts of human tragedy than some terrorist organisa-
tions. Because of their independence, the pre-emption of lone wolf terrorists by 
law enforcement is extremely difficult. Lone wolves are not a part of a terrorist 
organisation or a part of a terrorist network. There is nothing for law enforcement 
agents to infiltrate. Within the terrorism studies literature, lone wolf terrorists 
have usually been categorised according to their motivation or ideology. Within 
these broader types of categories, two types of lone wolf terrorist are observed. 
The first type is the ‘serial’ lone wolf terrorist who engages in a series of attacks 
over time, sometimes remaining active for more than a decade. The second type is 
the ‘spree’ lone wolf terrorist who engages in a sudden spree of violence, usually 
a shooting spree in a public place1, which is concentrated within a very short 
period of time. In this paper, we are concerned with the behaviour of this second 
type of lone wolf terrorist. 
Shooting sprees or other types of concentrated violence have been the attack 
method of choice for many of the lone wolf terrorists whose behaviour has been 
documented in both the United States and throughout Europe. Thirty cases of 
lone wolf terrorism are reported in the U.S. between 1968 and 2007. Nine cases are 
reported in Germany, seven in France, six in Spain and five in Italy over the same 
period2. In the United States between 1978 and 1999, 26 percent of the victims of 
terrorism were victims of lone wolf terrorism and the number of recorded inci-
dences of lone wolf terrorism rose from just two during the 1960s to thirteen in 
the 1990s (Spaaij 2010, p.859-860). The dominant attack methods deployed by 
the lone wolves active in the United States have been bombing and armed attacks 
(Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement 2007). Twenty-two of the lone 
wolves engaged in armed attacks. These armed attacks were predominantly 
either targeted shootings or single or multiple shooting sprees, with the latter 
being associated with a considerable number of injuries and fatalities.
The deadliest acts of lone wolf terrorism in the U.S. have been the shooting 
sprees attributed to Mark Essex (10 fatalities and 13 injuries), Joseph Paul Frank-
1  A shooting spree is the type of attack that immediately springs to mind. This is, no doubt, 
due to the popular usage of the word ‘spree’ in describing various acts of concentrated violence, 
especially those involving the use of firearms. However, a spree might involve bombing and the 
acts of violence may be continuous over a period of several days. If this definition is accepted, 
David Copeland is also an example of the ‘spree’ lone wolf. Copeland engaged in a 13-day bomb-
ing spree in London in 1999. He planted bombs in crowded areas on Saturday April 17, Saturday 
April 24 and Friday April 30. The bombs, laden with nails to maximise the number of injuries and 
fatalities, resulted in three fatalities and 129 injuries. 
2  Though when Europe is considered as a whole, there were 38 lone wolves active during the 
period throughout Europe. 
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lin (18 fatalities and 5 injuries), Joseph Christopher (5 fatalities and 1 injury) and 
Colin Ferguson (6 fatalities and 19 injuries). However, the archetypal modern 
example of the spree lone wolf is almost certainly Anders Behring Breivik. 
In Norway in July 2011 Breivik engaged in a bombing and shooting spree that 
resulted in the deaths of 77 people. The attacks were undertaken in two parts. 
First, a car bomb was left outside the government building that housed the offices 
of the Prime Minister. The bomb was detonated and killed eight people. Breivik 
then travelled approximately 40 kilometres to a youth camp where he murdered 
another 69 people in an hour-long shooting spree. This attack has highlighted the 
threat of lone wolf terrorism to European governments and their security agencies 
and became the most deadly incidence of lone wolf terrorism, overshadowing 
the 18 fatalities attributed to the actions of Joseph Paul Franklin in the U.S. in the 
1970s. 
In this paper, we wish to determine whether this type of ‘spree’ behaviour 
can be encompassed within an economic framework. That is, can sudden sprees 
of violence concentrated in a short space of time perpetrated by individuals who 
were hitherto uninvolved in terrorist activity be explained by an economic model 
of choice? Once this model has been constructed, we use empirical data to deter-
mine whether the predictions of the model are more or less consistent with the 
patterns of behaviour that we have observed to characterise lone wolf terrorists. 
In particular, we are interested in whether a model of attack method choice that 
explains ‘spree’ behaviour also predicts the use of ‘armed attacks’, which has 
been the attack method of choice for lone wolf terrorists involved in sudden 
sprees of violence. We shall also see what the model can say about the possibility 
that the ‘spree’ lone wolf terrorist will choose another type of attack method as 
his means of perpetrating an act of violence. This paper represents a step towards 
an economic analysis of terrorism that provides operationally relevant conclu-
sions that may be used by law enforcement in the investigative process.  
2  The Lone Wolf’s Opportunities and Choices
The economic model of choice that underlies this analysis is the mean-variance 
expected utility model (Phillips 2009, 2011 & 2012). This model simplifies the 
analysis of terrorism by reducing the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices to 
‘risk-payoff pairs’. Each attack method that the lone wolf may choose is associ-
ated with an expected payoff and a risk that the actual payoff may be different 
from what was expected. Given the words and deeds of terrorists, Phillips (2009) 
uses fatalities as the unit of payoff. This approach comes with the additional 
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advantage of associating the terrorist’s optimal or rational choice with his most 
dangerous choice. If the lone wolf terrorist has quadratic utility3 or if the payoffs 
to terrorism are normally distributed, the mean-variance analysis will be con-
sistent with the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms for rational behaviour. 
If these two conditions do not apply, mean-variance analysis will still produce 
preference orderings for attack methods that approximate those computed with a 
‘full’ expected utility analysis (Elton et al. 2003, p.232; Kroll, Levy and Markowitz 
1984; Levy and Markowitz 1979). 
The complete opportunity set of the lone wolf terrorist can be computed by 
determining all of the risk-payoff pairs that may be obtained given the available 
attack methods. We measure expected payoffs by the historical average (mean) 
fatalities per attack per year and we measure the risk of those payoffs by the his-
torical standard deviation or variance that characterises the fatalities per attack 
per year. This opportunity set tells us every possible combination of expected 
fatalities and risk that the terrorist can obtain using the available attack methods. 
The rational terrorist, however, will only be interested in those attack methods 
that have the highest expected number of fatalities at each level of risk. He will 
only be interested in the ‘efficient’ opportunity set (Phillips 2009). Because the 
payoffs to different attack methods are not perfectly correlated with each other, 
the efficient set will display convexity when the means and standard deviations 
of each possible attack method combination are plotted. Although there will be 
different opportunity sets for different levels of resource allocation to terrorism, 
we are interested in the case where the lone wolf suddenly allocates all of his 
resources, including time, to terrorism. Hence, the opportunity sets depicted in 
our diagrams are implicitly ‘100 percent resource allocation’ opportunity sets.
The lone wolf’s optimal choice from this opportunity set is a choice that max-
imises his expected utility. It is also his most dangerous choice. When working 
with geometry rather than equations, the lone wolf’s preferences are represented 
by an indifference curve map. Points of tangency between the efficient oppor-
tunity set and his highest indifference curve are points where utility is maxim-
ised given the available opportunities. For a risk-averse lone wolf terrorist with 
concave indifference curves, optimal choices may be represented as figure 2. 
We are interested in whether we can identify a type of utility maximising lone 
wolf – a particular representation of the indifference curve map – who exhibits 
3  It must also be noted that quadratic utility, while somewhat restrictive, approximates a broad-
er class of utility functions. The well-known criticisms of mean-variance analysis and quadratic 
utility come with several qualifications and counter-arguments. Furthermore, Phillips (2009 & 
2011) uses a normalised ‘fatalities per attack per year’ rather than a ‘raw’ fatalities count. 
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‘spree’ type behaviour. That is, no resource allocation to violent terrorism then, 
suddenly, 100 percent allocation to violent terrorism. This type of lone wolf is 
willing to absorb additional risk in return for increases in expected payoffs. At 
higher levels of risk he requires very little additional expected payoff in order 
to be enticed to bear an additional increment of risk. At very high levels of risk, 
it will take only a very small increase in expected payoff to entice this lone wolf 
to bear a lot more risk. When the expected payoffs to terrorism increase, this 
type of lone wolf will be observed to suddenly switch all of his resources into the 
attack methods that are available to him where previously all of his resources 
were devoted to other, non-violent activities. All at once he will ‘plunge’ all of 
his resources into the available attack methods. All at once he will engage in a 
spree. Such behaviour is encompassed by indifference curves that are upward 
Expected 
Payoff
Risk
The Efficient Set of Attack 
Method Opportunities
Figure 1: The Lone Wolf’s Efficient Opportunity Set 
Expected 
Payoff
Risk
Direction of 
Increasing Utility
Direction of 
Increasing Utility
More Risk Averse
Less Risk Averse
Optimal or Most 
Dangerous Choice
Figure 2: Optimal Choices of the Risk-Averse Lone Wolf
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sloping in expected payoff-risk space to reflect the special property that Tobin 
(1958) calls ‘plunging’. In our context: no resources allocated to the violent terror-
ism then, following a change in the risk-reward trade-off, all resources ‘plunged’ 
into violent terrorism. 
Expected 
Payoff
Risk 
U3
U2
With the opportunity set as it currently stands, zero
allocation to terrorism is the utility maximising position.
0
U1
Figure 3: Optimal Choices of the Plunging Lone Wolf
With the opportunity sets as they stand in Figure 3, the utility maximising 
position for the lone wolf is initially a zero allocation of resources to violent ter-
rorism because U2 is his highest feasible indifference curve. If he chose to engage 
in terrorism, he would be on a lower indifference curve with lower utility. His 
optimal choice is not to engage in terrorism given the current risk-reward trade-
offs. However, if he were to perceive an innovation in the risk-reward trade-offs 
available to him such that the efficient opportunity set moves upwards such that 
it intersects an indifference curve higher than U2, the lone wolf will ‘plunge’ all 
of his resources into terrorism. The plunging of all resources, including time, into 
terrorism may manifest itself as a spree. Where law enforcement had been pre-
viously unaware of the existence of a potential lone wolf threat because of his 
avoidance of terrorist actions, the spree lone wolf now emerges suddenly. He does 
not emerge as an individual who allocates some resources to terrorism and some 
resources to other activities. The spree lone wolf suddenly and all at once plunges 
all of his resources, including time, into violent terrorism. 
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3  The Optimality of Plunging: Empirical Data
Having established the possibility of encompassing spree type behaviour within 
an economic model of terrorist choice, we now turn our attention to determining 
whether the model of choice predicts 100 percent resource allocations to bombing 
and armed attacks. Both serial lone wolves and spree lone wolves have generally 
chosen armed attacks or bombing as their preferred attack methods (Instituut 
voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement 2007). To make this determination, we use 
the transnational terrorism data contained in the RAND-MIPT database for the 
period 1968 to 2006 to identify efficient4 resource allocations to individual attack 
methods at different levels of risk. Using the RAND-MIPT transnational terror-
ism database has the advantage of being ‘independent’ of any specifically lone 
wolf data series. What we are after is a data set that provides a good indication of 
the average fatalities and injuries that may be expected to be generated by par-
ticular attack methods. The RAND-MIPT data for transnational terrorism provides 
this. The identification of efficient resource allocations at different levels of risk 
involves solving the quadratic programming problem:
*)()(max
1
RREwRE
i
iii ==∑
=
     (1)
Where R* is maximum expected payoff to attack method i at a target level of 
return variance (risk), σ2*. The percentage of resources, wi, allocated to attack 
method i will be 1.00 or 100 percent when there is complete specialisation and 
some fraction between 0.00 and 1.00 when specialisation is less than complete. 
The target levels of risk σ2* at which this quadratic programming problem was 
solved are: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 ...42.5. The degrees of specialisation and 
attack methods that correspond to the solution of the quadratic programming 
problem at these levels of risk are presented in Table 1 below. 
At very low levels of risk, the lone wolf terrorist will allocate some of his 
resources to assassination. In equation (1), wi will be greater than 0.00 but less 
than 1.00. His optimal level of specialisation in assassination increases as the 
level of risk he wishes to bear increases but he never becomes a complete spe-
cialist—100 percent resource allocation—in assassination because at increasing 
levels of risk higher degrees of specialisation in assassination become dominated 
by lower degrees of specialisation in bombing. Granting assassination a wi = 1.00 
never solves equation (1) because before that point is reached a wi < 1.00 accorded 
to bombing begins to solve equation (1) as risk increases and as we move from left 
4  That is, resource allocations that yield maximum expected payoffs at each given level of risk. 
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to right along the efficient set depicted in Figure 1. Assassination no longer solves 
equation (1) at these higher levels of risk. The terrorist becomes a specialist in 
bombing at levels of risk (standard deviation) approaching 6.00. At higher levels 
of risk, bombing is superseded by hijacking, in which near specialisation may 
be observed, and at even higher levels of risk hijacking is superseded by armed 
attacks. At levels of risk (standard deviation) that approach 15.00 the lone wolf 
becomes a specialist in and allocates all of his resources to armed attacks. At the 
appropriate levels of risk both bombing and armed attacks represent solutions to 
the spree lone wolf’s utility maximisation problem. 
If a lone wolf can choose just one single attack method, his optimal opportu-
nities become an efficient set characterised by a single attack method and a par-
ticular level of specialisation in terrorism at particular levels of risk. For the most 
part, complete specialisation emerges as an optimal choice only at small number 
of points. It is far more usual to find wi < 1.00 for some attack method at most 
levels of risk. At very low levels of risk, complete specialisation is not expected at 
all. At the mid-range of risk, we do observe complete specialisation in terrorism – 
100 percent allocation of resources to terrorist attack methods—with 100 percent 
resource allocation to bombing being a constituent of the efficient set of attack 
method opportunities at a level of risk or standard deviation of 6.00. At the mid-
Risk (Standard 
Deviation)
Degree of 
Specialisation
Attack Method Expected Payoff
0.1 0.143 Assassination 0.22
0.2 0.286 Assassination 0.441
0.3 0.429 Assassination 0.66
0.4 0.572 Assassination 0.883
0.5 0.715 Assassination 1.10
1.0 0.166 Bombing 0.97
1.5 0.249 Bombing 1.46
2.0 0.333 Bombing 1.96
2.5 0.416 Bombing 2.45
3.0 0.499 Bombing 2.94
3.5 0.582 Bombing 3.43
4.0 0.666 Bombing 3.92
4.5 0.749 Bombing 4.41
5.0 0.832 Bombing 4.90
5.5 0.915 Bombing 5.39
6.0 0.999 Bombing 5.88
Table 1, Part 1: The Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice: Varying Specialisation Level
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to-high ranges of risk we observe almost complete specialisation in hijacking and 
complete specialisation in armed attacks at a level of risk or standard deviation 
approaching 15.00. A plunging spree lone wolf who can only choose bombing or 
armed attacks will find that these attack methods do solve his utility maximisa-
tion problem at their respective levels of risk. If he is willing to bear this risk and if 
he perceives an innovation in the risk-reward trade-off such that expected payoffs 
are higher at every level of risk, he will shift his resources completely into terrorist 
activity. 
Risk (Standard 
Deviation)
Degree of 
Specialisation
Attack Method Expected Payoff
6.5 0.609 Hijacking 2.38
7.0 0.655 Hijacking 2.56
7.5 0.702 Hijacking 2.74
8.0 0.749 Hijacking 2.93
8.5 0.796 Hijacking 3.11
9.0 0.843 Hijacking 3.29
9.5 0.890 Hijacking 3.47
10.0 0.936 Hijacking 3.66
10.5 0.983 Hijacking 3.84
11.0 0.743 Armed Attacks 3.95
11.5 0.777 Armed Attacks 4.13
12.0 0.810 Armed Attacks 4.31
12.5 0.844 Armed Attacks 4.49
13.0 0.878 Armed Attacks 4.67
13.5 0.912 Armed Attacks 4.85
14.0 0.945 Armed Attacks 5.03
14.5 0.979 Armed Attacks 5.21
Table 1, Part 2: The Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice: Varying Specialisation Level
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4  Conclusions and Implications
There are several implications for law enforcement. First, the spree lone wolf 
will be very sensitive to changes in the risk-reward trade-off. A risk-seeking lone 
wolf will already (and always) be at the point of maximum risk and maximum 
expected payoff. He is most likely planning or engaging in the riskiest attack 
methods: hostage-taking and ‘unconventional’ attacks. A risk averse serial lone 
wolf will adjust to changes in the risk-reward trade-off by increasing or decreas-
ing his engagement in terrorism or choosing different attack methods but he 
will never ‘plunge’ or engage in a spree of violence in response to changes in the 
risk-reward trade-off. Second, a spree must necessarily be a very violent action. 
A spree occurs when the lone wolf suddenly and all at once plunges all of his 
resources into terrorism. This is precipitated by a change in the risk-reward trade-
off that characterises terrorism. If the lone wolf’s perception is matched by a real 
upward shift in the efficient opportunity set, every attack method and combina-
tion now is expected to inflict a higher amount of human tragedy. Third, armed 
attacks and bombing represent utility maximising solutions for the spree lone 
wolf. This is consistent with the empirically observed attack method choices of 
lone wolf terrorists. 
Although the challenges presented to law enforcement by lone wolf terrorism 
are substantial, the analysis shows that the spree lone wolf’s actions must be pre-
cipitated by an upward movement in the efficient opportunity set (increase in the 
risk-reward ratio). Effective actions by law enforcement agencies serve to increase 
the risk and decrease the rewards of terrorism (decrease the risk-reward ratio). 
Effective law enforcement and vigilant security at public locations serve to ensure 
that the rewards available to terrorism do not rise more than proportionately to the 
risks. This represents the most effective check on the spree lone wolf. What must 
be guarded against is the unfavourable rebalancing through some security ini-
tiative of the deterrence-substitution effects that characterise terrorism. Defence 
economists have shown that security initiatives deter but also encourage substi-
tution (Landes 1978; Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983; Enders and Sandler 
1993; Sandler and Enders 2004). In the case of spree lone wolf terrorism, the most 
dangerous implication is that a targeted security initiative shifts law enforcement 
resources such that a particular type of terrorist action at a particular location 
becomes riskier without increasing the associated rewards (decrease in the risk-
reward ratio) whilst simultaneously the risk-reward ratio of an alternative attack 
method is increased. If the spree lone wolf senses this set of circumstances and 
perceives additional expected payoffs to be available at a given level of risk, the 
potential consequences are clear. He may suddenly and all at once plunge all of 
his resources into this attack method. 
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